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Abstract—We propose the use of forensic requirements to
drive the automation of a digital forensics process. We augment
traditional reactive digital forensics processes with proactive
evidence collection and analysis activities, and provide immediate
investigative suggestions before an investigation starts. These
activities adapt depending on suspicious events, which in turn
might require the collection and analysis of additional evidence.
The reactive activities of a traditional digital forensics process
are also adapted depending on the investigation findings.
Index Terms—digital forensics; adaptation; arguments
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital forensics [1] aims to collect and analyse digital
evidence necessary to demonstrate how a computer crime was
committed, what harm was done, and who was responsible.
A digital forensics investigation thus collects and analyses
the evidence necessary to demonstrate a potential hypothesis
of a crime. It also includes a presentation activity to illus-
trate proven/refuted hypothesis. While several tools, such as
EnCase [2], are available to automate evidence collection,
investigations are still highly human-intensive. Existing tools
do not provide any investigative suggestion about what are
the possible hypotheses, the evidence they require to be
demonstrated, and their likelihood of being true. Since the
findings of a digital investigation should be based on objective
evidence, a digital forensics process should use well founded
and systematic techniques to assess the likelihood of each
hypothesis and provide sound evidence in court.
This paper augments digital forensics processes with proac-
tive analysis and collection activities. These activities pre-
serve and analyze important evidence before an investigation
starts. The outcome of such activities is then used to pro-
vide immediate suggestions about what hypotheses should be
investigated (because they are more likely to be true) and
what evidence should be collected to prove/refute them. To
preserve important evidence, proactive analysis must identify
suspicious events that require the adaptation of proactive
collection activities in order to gather additional evidence. The
reactive activities of a traditional digital forensics process may
also adapt depending on the investigation findings.
Our approach applies requirements engineering techniques
to configure the behavior of an adaptive digital forensics
process. We propose to model the forensics requirements to
capture the crime scene and the potential hypotheses of the
crime. We use structured arguments, forensics arguments, to
represent the hypotheses of crime. Each hypothesis is a claim
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that is related to a set of facts necessary to prove or refute it.
The facts represent the evidence to be collected from the digi-
tal devices (evidence sources) available at the crime scene. We
formally express forensics arguments in the Event Calculus [3]
and support the formal verification of hypotheses depending
on the percentage of facts that have been demonstrated (i.e.
ampliative probability [4]). Forensics arguments are also used
to express conditions that may start/stop the full evidence
collection performed proactively. Thus, forensics requirements
are used to instrument the proactive and reactive activities of
a digital forensics process.
II. ADAPTIVE DIGITAL FORENSICS PROCESS
As shown in Figure 1, our approach comprises eight steps.
1) Requirements Modeling: a security administrator pre-
scribes the forensics requirements. These include a domain
model of a crime scene, which represents the assets that
can be harmed, the topology of the physical space where
a crime can be committed, the configuration of the digital
devices available, users’ roles and permissions. For example,
the crime scene may indicate that a valuable document (Doc)
is stored on a machine (M1) located in an office (T225), and
only authorised employees (Alice and Bob) can access this
office, by swiping their badges on an NFC reader (NFC). A
CCTV monitors the entrance and exit to/from T225. The se-
curity administrator also reconstructs the forensics arguments.
These may represent suspicious events conditions that must
hold to start and stop the full evidence collection performed
proactively (start/stop arguments). They also represent the
hypothesis of potential crimes that can be committed in the
crime scene (reactive arguments). These arguments are initially
expressed in a generic form and are subsequently customised
depending on the model of the crime scene. For example, the
potential hypothesis of a crime can state that at least one user
is in T225, one of the employees accesses the Doc in M1 while
his/her USB pen is mounted. The start and stop argument
can then express respectively the conditions that signal that
an employee is logged on M1 and accesses the Doc and an
employee is no longer logged on M1.
2) Configuration: the Requirements Manager uses the
forensics requirements to configure the digital forensics pro-
cess. It uses the start and stop arguments to configure the
Proactive Analysis. It also leverages the data necessary to
check the start and stop arguments to configure the Proactive
Collection, such as accesses to T225 (from the log of the
NFC), logins on M1 and accesses to Doc (from the system
and registry log of M1). The Requirements Manager uses the
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Fig. 1. Adaptive Digital Forensics Process.
reactive arguments to generate all possible hypotheses of a
crime, which are given as input to the Reactive Analysis. For
our example, a number of hypotheses (12) is generated. These
are obtained by customizing the reactive argument depending
on who can be in T225 (Alice only, Bob only, or Alice and
Bob together), who can log on M1 (Alice or Bob), and who
can own a USB pen that is mounted on M1 (Alice or Bob).
3) Proactive Collection: during the normal system func-
tioning, the Monitor collects the data identified during the
previous step, sends them to the Event Calculus Analyzer
(Analyzer) and stores them securely.
4) Proactive Analysis: every time new evidence is avail-
able, the Analyzer checks whether the conditions to start/stop
the full evidence collection are satisfied and sends the results
to the Requirements Manager. In case a start argument is
satisfied for a set of specific elements of the crime scene, the
Requirements Manager reconfigures the Proactive Analysis to
check whether the corresponding stop argument is satisfied
for the same elements of the crime scene. The Proactive
Collection is reconfigured to gather all possible evidence. For
example, if Bob is logged on M1 and accesses the Doc,
the stop argument that should be checked by the Proactive
Analysis claims that Bob is no longer logged on M1. While
the Proactive Collection gathers additional events, such as
when devices are mounted, unmounted, or installed on M1.
When the full evidence collection is switched on and the
stop argument is satisfied, the proactive collection and analysis
activities are (re-)configured as in step 2.
5) Investigation Set-up: when an investigation starts, the
Analyzer retrieves the data collected by the Proactive Analysis
from the secure storage.
6) Reactive Analysis: the Analyzer evaluates the satis-
faction of each hypothesis and sends the results to the Pre-
sentation activity. The Analyzer uses the abductive reasoning
functionality of the Event Calculus. For each hypothesis that
can still be satisfied, the Analyzer generates a set of potential
events that represent the missing evidence necessary to satisfy
this hypothesis. For example, when an investigation starts, we
can assume that the sequence of events retrieved from the
Secure Storage state that Bob was logged on M1 and accessed
the Doc while a USB was mounted. In this case, the Analyzer
will discover that only a subset (6) of the original hypotheses
are satisfiable (the ones that state that Bob logged on M1).
7) Presentation: this activity shows the probability of
satisfaction of each hypothesis. The investigator selects the
hypotheses s/he wants to focus on and receives indications
regarding the remaining evidence to be collected. For example,
the investigator is advised to collect additional evidence from
a CCTV to confirm that Bob is in T225 when he logged on
M1, and to verify whether Bob owns the USB pen.
8) Reactive Collection: the investigator retrieves the re-
maining evidence, by using, for example, existing commercial
tools, stores it securely and sends it to the Analyzer that
updates the satisfaction of the hypothesis. The cycle (steps 5-
8) continues until the investigator identifies a set of hypotheses
that can be presented persuasively in court.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Although several research approaches have been proposed
to collect forensically sound evidence, only a few work use
formal techniques to analyse acquired evidence to prove/refute
the hypotheses of a crime. Formal techniques have the advan-
tage of being sound and enabling the automatic analysis of
the acquired evidence. Some existing approaches use finite
state machines [5] and the event calculus [6] for events recon-
struction. However, none of them suggests how to automate
and adapt the whole digital investigation. One approach [7]
integrates proactive collection and analysis of digital evidence
with reactive digital forensics processes. However, it does
not provide any detail on how a digital forensics process
should be configured and how proactive digital evidence can
be used during an investigation. We suggest that providing a
requirements-driven approach can facilitate a digital investiga-
tion and shorten the cycles for the events reconstruction.
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